revert: leave AGENTS.md and CONTRIBUTING.md unchanged

Keep the secure coding standard as the only change.

Co-authored-by: matt <matt@crewai.com>

docs/security/secure-coding-standard.md

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+# Secure Coding Standard
+
+This document is authoritative for all AI coding agents, automated code
+reviewers, and human contributors. Any conflict between generated code and this
+standard MUST be resolved in favor of this standard.
+
+This document defines the minimum secure coding requirements for all CrewAI
+open-source repositories.
+
+Its goals are to:
+
+1. Produce secure-by-default code.
+2. Guide AI coding agents during implementation.
+3. Provide objective criteria for security code reviews.
+4. Reduce false-positive vulnerability reports by defining the project's
+   expected security controls.
+
+All requirements in this document are normative.
+
+The keywords **MUST**, **MUST NOT**, **SHOULD**, **SHOULD NOT**, and **MAY**
+are interpreted as described in RFC 2119.
+
+---
+
+# Scope
+
+This document specifies **insecure-coding** requirements: injection, path
+traversal, unsafe deserialization, secret exposure, unbounded I/O, and similar
+implementation defects.
+
+It does **not** specify model-level or product-threat controls. Prompt
+injection, tool-metadata influence, and similar AI risks belong in
+`docs/security/threat-model.md`, not here.
+
+---
+
+# Security Principles
+
+All code MUST follow these principles.
+
+## Validate Untrusted Input
+
+Assume all external input is untrusted until validated.
+
+Examples include:
+
+- User input
+- HTTP requests
+- Environment variables
+- Files
+- Archives
+- LLM responses
+- Tool outputs
+- Plugin outputs
+- Network responses
+
+---
+
+## Least Privilege
+
+Components MUST only receive the permissions they require.
+
+Avoid unnecessary:
+
+- filesystem access
+- network access
+- process execution
+- credentials
+- secrets
+
+---
+
+## Fail Securely
+
+Security-sensitive operations MUST fail closed.
+
+Do not continue after:
+
+- failed authorization
+- failed validation
+- partial execution
+- partial transactions
+
+Roll back where appropriate.
+
+---
+
+## Defense in Depth
+
+Security MUST NOT rely on a single validation step.
+
+Where appropriate:
+
+- validate input
+- authorize operations
+- restrict capabilities
+- log security events
+- enforce resource limits
+
+---
+
+# Approved Project Abstractions
+
+AI-generated and human-authored code MUST use these helpers instead of new
+implementations of the same control.
+
+| Control | MUST use |
+|---|---|
+| File and directory containment | `crewai_tools.security.safe_path.validate_file_path`, `validate_directory_path` |
+| Path and error display | `format_path_for_display`, `format_error_for_display`, `format_sandbox_error` |
+| URL validation | `crewai_tools.security.safe_path.validate_url` |
+| HTTP fetch | `crewai_tools.security.safe_requests.safe_get`, `safe_get_bounded` |
+| Archive extraction | `tarfile.extractall(..., filter="data")` when available; otherwise the `_safe_extractall` / `_safe_extract_zip` pattern in `crewai.skills.cache` and `crewai_cli.skills.main` |
+| YAML | `yaml.safe_load()` |
+| Project Python references | existing crew-loader confinement to the project root; MUST NOT add a parallel importer |
+| SQL values | parameterized queries / bind parameters |
+| SQL statement policy in NL2SQL-style tools | the existing default-deny DML / multi-statement checks in `NL2SQLTool` |
+
+`crewai_tools.utilities.safe_path` is a compatibility re-export. New code MUST
+import from `crewai_tools.security.safe_path`.
+
+Calling `validate_url()` and then `requests.get()` is **not** sufficient. DNS
+rebinding and redirect hops require `safe_get` / `safe_get_bounded`.
+
+`CREWAI_TOOLS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_PATHS` disables both path and SSRF checks
+process-wide. New code MUST NOT add another process-wide escape hatch. Prefer
+`base_dir` to widen a sandbox. Managed workers MUST keep
+`CREWAI_TOOLS_FORCE_SAFE_PATHS` as the override that cannot be disabled by
+`ALLOW_UNSAFE_PATHS`.
+
+Existing uses of prohibited APIs in this repository do not authorize copying
+those APIs into new code.
+
+---
+
+# 1. Command Execution
+
+## Risk
+
+Unsafe process execution may result in command injection or arbitrary command
+execution.
+
+## MUST NOT
+
+- `os.system()`
+- `os.popen()`
+- `subprocess.run(..., shell=True)`
+- `subprocess.Popen(..., shell=True)`
+- `subprocess.call(..., shell=True)`
+- `subprocess.check_call(..., shell=True)`
+- `subprocess.check_output(..., shell=True)`
+
+MUST NOT construct shell commands using:
+
+- string concatenation
+- f-strings
+- `%` formatting
+- `.format()`
+
+## MUST
+
+Use:
+
+```python
+subprocess.run([...], shell=False, check=True)
+```
+
+Pass arguments as a list.
+
+Validate all externally influenced arguments.
+
+The executable and each argument that is not a literal or allowlisted constant
+MUST be validated before use. Hardcoded optional-dependency installs such as
+`subprocess.run(["uv", "add", "package"], shell=False, check=True)` are
+acceptable only when no argument is derived from untrusted input.
+
+---
+
+# 2. Filesystem Access
+
+## Risk
+
+Unsafe filesystem operations may allow:
+
+- path traversal
+- symlink attacks
+- arbitrary file overwrite
+- unauthorized file access
+
+## MUST NOT
+
+- Trust user-provided paths.
+- Validate paths using `startswith()`.
+- Extract archives without validating every entry.
+
+## MUST
+
+- Canonicalize paths.
+- Validate against an approved root directory.
+- Reject paths escaping the allowed root.
+- Validate archive contents before extraction.
+
+In `crewai-tools`, MUST call `validate_file_path` or
+`validate_directory_path`. MUST NOT reimplement containment with `startswith`,
+string prefix checks, or manual `..` filtering. The helpers resolve symlinks
+and `..` before comparing against `base_dir`.
+
+Archive members MUST be validated before extraction, including symlink and
+hardlink targets, not only member names. Copy the existing `_safe_extractall`
+/ `_safe_extract_zip` checks; do not add `extractall` without them.
+
+---
+
+# 3. Dynamic Code Execution
+
+## Risk
+
+Executing attacker-controlled code results in arbitrary code execution.
+
+## MUST NOT
+
+- `eval()`
+- `exec()`
+- `compile()` on untrusted input
+- Dynamic imports from user-controlled values
+
+## MUST
+
+Use:
+
+- explicit parsing
+- JSON
+- Pydantic models
+- controlled plugin registries
+- allowlists
+
+`ast.literal_eval` MAY be used to parse literals. It is not a substitute for
+`json.loads` when the input is JSON.
+
+Project definition Python references MUST resolve through the existing loader,
+which confines imports to the project root and rejects stdlib/external targets
+such as `os.system`. New code MUST NOT call `importlib.import_module` on a
+value derived from untrusted input.
+
+---
+
+# 4. Deserialization
+
+## Risk
+
+Unsafe deserialization can execute arbitrary code.
+
+## MUST NOT
+
+- `pickle.load()`
+- `pickle.loads()`
+- `dill.load()`
+- `dill.loads()`
+- `marshal.loads()`
+- `yaml.load()` with unsafe loaders
+
+## MUST
+
+Use:
+
+- `json.loads()`
+- `yaml.safe_load()`
+- schema validation
+- Pydantic models
+
+Do not add new pickle, dill, or marshal loaders. Existing pickle usage is not
+a template for new code.
+
+---
+
+# 5. Injection
+
+## Risk
+
+User-controlled data MUST NOT become executable instructions.
+
+Includes:
+
+- SQL Injection
+- Command Injection
+- Template Injection
+- LDAP Injection
+- XPath Injection
+- NoSQL Injection
+- Log Injection
+
+## MUST NOT
+
+- Build SQL using string formatting.
+- Build commands using string concatenation.
+- Insert unescaped user input into templates.
+
+## MUST
+
+Use:
+
+- parameterized queries
+- prepared statements
+- structured logging
+- output encoding
+
+SQL values MUST be passed as bind parameters (for example SQLAlchemy
+`text(query)` with a params mapping). MUST NOT interpolate untrusted strings
+into the query text.
+
+Tools that accept whole SQL statements MUST keep a default-deny write policy
+and reject stacked statements in read-only mode, following `NL2SQLTool`. MUST
+NOT add a new SQL tool that executes caller-supplied SQL with no statement
+policy.
+
+---
+
+# 6. Network Requests
+
+## Risk
+
+Network requests can expose internal services or leak sensitive information.
+
+## MUST NOT
+
+- Disable TLS verification.
+- Fetch arbitrary URLs without validation.
+- Follow redirects blindly.
+- Make requests without timeouts.
+
+## MUST
+
+- Validate URLs.
+- Restrict supported protocols.
+- Block localhost and private addresses where appropriate.
+- Configure connection and read timeouts.
+- Verify TLS certificates.
+
+In `crewai-tools` and any code that fetches URLs chosen at runtime, MUST use
+`safe_get` or `safe_get_bounded`. Those helpers:
+
+- allow only `http`/`https`
+- block `file://`
+- reject private, loopback, link-local, and metadata addresses
+- validate every redirect hop
+- pin TCP to the checked IP
+- strip credentials on cross-origin redirects
+- default timeout to 30 seconds
+
+`safe_get_bounded` MUST be used when the response body is read into memory.
+
+MUST NOT pass `verify=False`. MUST NOT follow redirects with a raw
+`requests`/`httpx` client.
+
+---
+
+# 7. Secrets
+
+## Risk
+
+Hardcoded or exposed secrets compromise deployments.
+
+## MUST NOT
+
+- Hardcode API keys.
+- Hardcode passwords.
+- Hardcode tokens.
+- Hardcode private keys.
+- Log secrets.
+- Return secrets in exceptions.
+- Commit credentials to source control.
+
+## MUST
+
+Use:
+
+- environment variables
+- secret management systems
+- secret masking
+- dependency injection
+
+Logs, metrics, traces, and exceptions MUST NOT contain secrets or absolute
+filesystem prefixes. Use `format_path_for_display` and
+`format_error_for_display` instead of interpolating raw paths or `OSError`
+text.
+
+---
+
+# 8. Authorization
+
+## Risk
+
+Every sensitive operation requires authorization.
+
+## MUST NOT
+
+- Trust user-supplied roles.
+- Trust user-supplied ownership.
+- Skip authorization checks.
+- Expand tool capabilities beyond their documented purpose.
+
+## MUST
+
+- Verify authorization before sensitive operations.
+- Enforce least privilege.
+- Validate ownership server-side.
+- Respect documented trust boundaries.
+
+---
+
+# 9. Resource Management
+
+## Risk
+
+Unbounded operations may result in denial of service.
+
+## MUST NOT
+
+- Read unbounded files.
+- Create infinite loops.
+- Allow unlimited retries.
+- Spawn unlimited threads.
+- Process unlimited input.
+- Execute operations without timeouts.
+
+## MUST
+
+- Limit file sizes.
+- Limit memory usage.
+- Configure execution timeouts.
+- Configure network timeouts.
+- Limit concurrency.
+- Validate input sizes.
+
+HTTP response bodies MUST be capped with `safe_get_bounded`. File and archive
+readers MUST enforce a size limit before loading content into memory. Network
+and subprocess calls MUST set a timeout.
+
+In `crewai-files`, MUST reuse the existing provider constraint validators
+rather than adding unbounded reads.
+
+---
+
+# 10. Cryptography
+
+## Risk
+
+Weak cryptography compromises confidentiality and integrity.
+
+## MUST NOT
+
+- Use `random` for security-sensitive values.
+- Invent cryptographic algorithms.
+- Store plaintext passwords.
+- Compare secrets using normal equality.
+- Disable certificate validation.
+
+## MUST
+
+Use:
+
+- `secrets`
+- `hmac.compare_digest()`
+- Argon2id, bcrypt, or scrypt
+- authenticated encryption
+- modern TLS
+
+---
+
+# Error Handling
+
+Security-relevant exceptions MUST be handled intentionally.
+
+## MUST NOT
+
+- Swallow exceptions.
+- Continue after partial failure.
+- Expose stack traces to users.
+- Leak filesystem paths or secrets.
+
+## MUST
+
+- Fail securely.
+- Roll back incomplete operations.
+- Return safe error messages.
+- Log security-relevant failures.
+
+User-facing tool errors MUST go through `format_sandbox_error` /
+`format_error_for_display` so they do not advertise
+`CREWAI_TOOLS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_PATHS` or leak absolute paths.
+
+---
+
+# Security Logging
+
+The following SHOULD generate security logs where applicable:
+
+- authentication attempts
+- authorization failures
+- input validation failures
+- rejected commands
+- rejected filesystem access
+- security policy violations
+- privilege changes
+- security configuration changes
+
+Logs MUST NOT contain:
+
+- passwords
+- API keys
+- tokens
+- private keys
+- sensitive personal data
+- absolute filesystem prefixes of rejected paths
+
+---
+
+# AI Code Generation
+
+AI-generated code MUST be treated as untrusted until reviewed.
+
+Before completing an implementation, AI coding agents MUST:
+
+1. Review generated code against this document.
+2. Remove prohibited APIs and patterns.
+3. Verify that security controls have not been removed.
+4. Prefer approved project abstractions over new implementations.
+5. State any security assumptions made.
+
+AI MUST NOT remove or weaken existing:
+
+- validation
+- authorization
+- error handling
+- logging
+- resource limits
+
+without explicit justification.
+
+New code MUST NOT introduce APIs listed as MUST NOT, including when similar
+calls already exist elsewhere in the tree.
+
+---
+
+# AI Security Reviews
+
+When reviewing existing code, findings MUST distinguish between:
+
+- Security vulnerabilities
+- Hardening recommendations
+- Code quality issues
+
+The existence of a dangerous API does not, by itself, establish a security
+vulnerability.
+
+A valid finding MUST demonstrate:
+
+1. Attacker-controlled input.
+2. Reachable source-to-sink data flow.
+3. A security-sensitive operation.
+4. Failure of an intended security control.
+5. Demonstrable security impact.
+
+Reports MUST follow the assumptions defined in
+`docs/security/threat-model.md`.
+
+This split is intentional:
+
+- **Implementation** follows the MUST / MUST NOT rules so new code is
+  secure-by-default.
+- **Vulnerability reports** require the five-point test so existing or
+  gated use of a dangerous API is not filed as a CVE without a reachable
+  exploit.
+
+---
+
+# Pull Request Checklist
+
+Before merging, verify:
+
+- [ ] No prohibited APIs introduced.
+- [ ] Approved project abstractions used instead of new security helpers.
+- [ ] Inputs are validated.
+- [ ] Authorization is enforced.
+- [ ] No unsafe deserialization.
+- [ ] No injection vulnerabilities.
+- [ ] Network requests are bounded and validated.
+- [ ] Secrets are not exposed.
+- [ ] Resource limits exist.
+- [ ] Errors fail securely.
+- [ ] Security logging is preserved.
+- [ ] AI-generated code has been reviewed against this document.