Files
crewAI/lib/cli/tests/skills/test_safe_extract.py
João Moura f0704ebb22 feat(skills)!: promote Skills Repository out of experimental (#6579)
* feat(skills)!: promote Skills Repository out of experimental

The registry-backed Skills Repository (crewai skill create/publish/
install/list, @org/name refs, global cache) is now mainline:

- CLI: `crewai skill ...` is a top-level group; the CREWAI_EXPERIMENTAL
  gate and the now-empty `crewai experimental` group are removed.
- Runtime: registry.py, cache.py, and events.py move from
  crewai.experimental.skills into crewai.skills next to the loader;
  the require_experimental_skills() gate is gone.
  crewai.experimental.skills remains as a deprecated re-export shim.
- Docs: concepts/skills now leads with the CLI workflow and documents
  the create -> publish -> install lifecycle.

Linear: n/a (requested promotion)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* feat(skills): org-scoped publish only + docs in all languages

Skills are always scoped to the publishing organization, like tools:
drop the --public/--private flags from `crewai skill publish` and
always send is_public=False to the registry. CLI tests assert the flag
is rejected and the API never receives a public publish.

Translate the new CLI-first Quick Start and the create -> publish ->
install lifecycle section into ar, pt-BR, and ko concepts/skills docs.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(skills): address review comments on the promotion PR

- Back-compat shim now aliases the old submodules in sys.modules so
  `crewai.experimental.skills.registry/cache/events` imports (and patch
  targets) resolve to the real crewai.skills modules, not just the
  package-root re-exports.
- `crewai skill publish` actually enforces the git-state check that
  --force claims to skip: unsynced repos block publishing (mirroring
  tool publish); standalone skill dirs outside any git repo publish
  without a check.
- Explicit UTF-8 encoding on SKILL.md and cache-metadata reads/writes.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(skills): fail closed when git state cannot be validated on publish

Follow deploy's pattern: construct git.Repository(fetch=False) and only
treat "not a Git repository" as skippable — any other git error
(fetch/auth/misconfiguration) now blocks publish with a --force escape
hatch instead of silently bypassing the sync check.

Also single-style imports in the shim test (CodeQL) with the dotted
shim import covered via importlib.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix(skills): fetch before sync check on publish; bump mcp past advisories

Publish now refreshes remote-tracking refs (repository.fetch()) before
is_synced(), so ahead/behind is judged against the actual remote rather
than stale local refs; a failing fetch blocks publish with the --force
escape hatch. Adds a fail-closed test for fetch errors.

Raise mcp to >=1.28.1,<2 (locks 1.28.1): the ~=1.26.0 pin blocked
GHSA-hvrp-rf83-w775 / GHSA-jpw9-pfvf-9f58 (fixed 1.27.2) and
GHSA-vj7q-gjh5-988w (fixed 1.28.1), which were failing pip-audit on
this PR.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Claude Fable 5 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Co-authored-by: Vinicius Brasil <vini@hey.com>
2026-07-17 14:21:15 +00:00

141 lines
4.6 KiB
Python

"""Regression tests for path-traversal-safe archive extraction.
Guards against symlink/hardlink-based path traversal in the fallback used on
Python versions without tarfile extraction filters. The filtered path relies on
`tarfile.extractall(..., filter="data")`; the fallback must provide the same
protection by validating link targets, not just member names.
"""
from __future__ import annotations
import io
import tarfile
from pathlib import Path
import pytest
from crewai_cli.skills.main import _safe_extractall
def _tar_from_members(build) -> tarfile.TarFile:
"""Build an in-memory tar archive via `build(tf)` and return it for reading."""
buf = io.BytesIO()
with tarfile.open(fileobj=buf, mode="w") as tf:
build(tf)
buf.seek(0)
return tarfile.open(fileobj=buf, mode="r")
def test_blocks_symlink_escaping_destination(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
"""A symlink whose target escapes dest, plus a file written through it,
must be rejected before anything is extracted."""
outside = tmp_path / "outside"
outside.mkdir()
dest = tmp_path / "dest"
dest.mkdir()
def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:
link = tarfile.TarInfo("link")
link.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE
link.linkname = str(outside) # absolute path outside dest
tf.addfile(link)
payload = b"pwned"
info = tarfile.TarInfo("link/evil.txt")
info.size = len(payload)
tf.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))
with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="escaping destination"):
_safe_extractall(tf, dest)
assert not (outside / "evil.txt").exists()
def test_blocks_relative_symlink_escaping_destination(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
"""A relative symlink (../..) that escapes dest is also rejected."""
dest = tmp_path / "dest"
dest.mkdir()
def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:
link = tarfile.TarInfo("sub/link")
link.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE
link.linkname = "../../outside" # escapes dest from sub/
tf.addfile(link)
with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="escaping destination"):
_safe_extractall(tf, dest)
def test_blocks_hardlink_escaping_destination(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
"""A hardlink whose target escapes dest is rejected."""
dest = tmp_path / "dest"
dest.mkdir()
def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:
link = tarfile.TarInfo("escape")
link.type = tarfile.LNKTYPE
link.linkname = "../outside.txt" # escapes archive root
tf.addfile(link)
with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="escaping destination"):
_safe_extractall(tf, dest)
def test_blocks_special_tar_member(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
"""Special tar members such as FIFOs are rejected."""
dest = tmp_path / "dest"
dest.mkdir()
def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:
fifo = tarfile.TarInfo("pipe")
fifo.type = tarfile.FIFOTYPE
tf.addfile(fifo)
with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="unsupported tar member"):
_safe_extractall(tf, dest)
def test_allows_benign_relative_symlink(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
"""A symlink that stays within dest is permitted."""
dest = tmp_path / "dest"
dest.mkdir()
def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:
payload = b"hi"
info = tarfile.TarInfo("real.txt")
info.size = len(payload)
tf.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))
link = tarfile.TarInfo("alias.txt")
link.type = tarfile.SYMTYPE
link.linkname = "real.txt" # stays inside dest
tf.addfile(link)
with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:
_safe_extractall(tf, dest)
assert (dest / "real.txt").read_bytes() == b"hi"
assert (dest / "alias.txt").is_symlink()
assert (dest / "alias.txt").readlink() == Path("real.txt")
def test_allows_benign_archive(tmp_path: Path) -> None:
"""An ordinary archive of regular files extracts correctly."""
dest = tmp_path / "dest"
dest.mkdir()
def build(tf: tarfile.TarFile) -> None:
for name, body in (("SKILL.md", b"# skill"), ("scripts/run.py", b"print(1)")):
payload = body
info = tarfile.TarInfo(name)
info.size = len(payload)
tf.addfile(info, io.BytesIO(payload))
with _tar_from_members(build) as tf:
_safe_extractall(tf, dest)
assert (dest / "SKILL.md").read_bytes() == b"# skill"
assert (dest / "scripts" / "run.py").read_bytes() == b"print(1)"