Files
crewAI/lib/crewai-tools/tests/utilities/test_safe_path.py
Greyson LaLonde 868416bfe0 fix: add SSRF and path traversal protections (#5315)
* fix: add SSRF and path traversal protections

CVE-2026-2286: validate_url blocks non-http/https schemes, private
IPs, loopback, link-local, reserved addresses. Applied to 11 web tools.

CVE-2026-2285: validate_path confines file access to the working
directory. Applied to 7 file and directory tools.

* fix: drop unused assignment from validate_url call

* fix: DNS rebinding protection and allow_private flag

Rewrite validated URLs to use the resolved IP, preventing DNS rebinding
between validation and request time. SDK-based tools use pin_ip=False
since they manage their own HTTP clients. Add allow_private flag for
deployments that need internal network access.

* fix: unify security utilities and restore RAG chokepoint validation

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: move validation to security/ package + address review comments

- Move safe_path.py to crewai_tools/security/; add safe_url.py re-export
- Keep utilities/safe_path.py as a backwards-compat shim
- Update all 21 import sites to use crewai_tools.security.safe_path
- files_compressor_tool: validate output_path (user-controlled)
- serper_scrape_website_tool: call validate_url() before building payload
- brightdata_unlocker: validate_url() already called without assignment (no-op fix)

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* refactor: move validation to security/ package, keep utilities/ as compat shim

- security/safe_path.py is the canonical location for all validation
- utilities/safe_path.py re-exports for backward compatibility
- All tool imports already point to security.safe_path
- All review comments already addressed in prior commits

* fix: move validation outside try/except blocks, use correct directory validator

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>

* fix: use resolved paths from validation to prevent symlink TOCTOU, remove unused safe_url.py

---------

Co-authored-by: Alex <alex@crewai.com>
Co-authored-by: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-04-07 14:44:50 -03:00

171 lines
6.7 KiB
Python

"""Tests for path and URL validation utilities."""
from __future__ import annotations
import os
import pytest
from crewai_tools.security.safe_path import (
validate_directory_path,
validate_file_path,
validate_url,
)
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# File path validation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestValidateFilePath:
"""Tests for validate_file_path."""
def test_valid_relative_path(self, tmp_path):
"""Normal relative path within the base directory."""
(tmp_path / "data.json").touch()
result = validate_file_path("data.json", str(tmp_path))
assert result == str(tmp_path / "data.json")
def test_valid_nested_path(self, tmp_path):
"""Nested path within base directory."""
(tmp_path / "sub").mkdir()
(tmp_path / "sub" / "file.txt").touch()
result = validate_file_path("sub/file.txt", str(tmp_path))
assert result == str(tmp_path / "sub" / "file.txt")
def test_rejects_dotdot_traversal(self, tmp_path):
"""Reject ../ traversal that escapes base_dir."""
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="outside the allowed directory"):
validate_file_path("../../etc/passwd", str(tmp_path))
def test_rejects_absolute_path_outside_base(self, tmp_path):
"""Reject absolute path outside base_dir."""
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="outside the allowed directory"):
validate_file_path("/etc/passwd", str(tmp_path))
def test_allows_absolute_path_inside_base(self, tmp_path):
"""Allow absolute path that's inside base_dir."""
(tmp_path / "ok.txt").touch()
result = validate_file_path(str(tmp_path / "ok.txt"), str(tmp_path))
assert result == str(tmp_path / "ok.txt")
def test_rejects_symlink_escape(self, tmp_path):
"""Reject symlinks that point outside base_dir."""
link = tmp_path / "sneaky_link"
# Create a symlink pointing to /etc/passwd
os.symlink("/etc/passwd", str(link))
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="outside the allowed directory"):
validate_file_path("sneaky_link", str(tmp_path))
def test_defaults_to_cwd(self):
"""When no base_dir is given, use cwd."""
cwd = os.getcwd()
# A file in cwd should be valid
result = validate_file_path(".", None)
assert result == os.path.realpath(cwd)
def test_escape_hatch(self, tmp_path, monkeypatch):
"""CREWAI_TOOLS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_PATHS=true bypasses validation."""
monkeypatch.setenv("CREWAI_TOOLS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_PATHS", "true")
# This would normally be rejected
result = validate_file_path("/etc/passwd", str(tmp_path))
assert result == os.path.realpath("/etc/passwd")
class TestValidateDirectoryPath:
"""Tests for validate_directory_path."""
def test_valid_directory(self, tmp_path):
(tmp_path / "subdir").mkdir()
result = validate_directory_path("subdir", str(tmp_path))
assert result == str(tmp_path / "subdir")
def test_rejects_file_as_directory(self, tmp_path):
(tmp_path / "file.txt").touch()
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not a directory"):
validate_directory_path("file.txt", str(tmp_path))
def test_rejects_traversal(self, tmp_path):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="outside the allowed directory"):
validate_directory_path("../../", str(tmp_path))
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
# URL validation
# ---------------------------------------------------------------------------
class TestValidateUrl:
"""Tests for validate_url."""
def test_valid_https_url(self):
"""Normal HTTPS URL should pass."""
result = validate_url("https://example.com/data.json")
assert result == "https://example.com/data.json"
def test_valid_http_url(self):
"""Normal HTTP URL should pass."""
result = validate_url("http://example.com/api")
assert result == "http://example.com/api"
def test_blocks_file_scheme(self):
"""file:// URLs must be blocked."""
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="file:// URLs are not allowed"):
validate_url("file:///etc/passwd")
def test_blocks_file_scheme_with_host(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="file:// URLs are not allowed"):
validate_url("file://localhost/etc/shadow")
def test_blocks_localhost(self):
"""localhost must be blocked (resolves to 127.0.0.1)."""
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private/reserved IP"):
validate_url("http://localhost/admin")
def test_blocks_127_0_0_1(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private/reserved IP"):
validate_url("http://127.0.0.1/admin")
def test_blocks_cloud_metadata(self):
"""AWS/GCP/Azure metadata endpoint must be blocked."""
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private/reserved IP"):
validate_url("http://169.254.169.254/latest/meta-data/")
def test_blocks_private_10_range(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private/reserved IP"):
validate_url("http://10.0.0.1/internal")
def test_blocks_private_172_range(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private/reserved IP"):
validate_url("http://172.16.0.1/internal")
def test_blocks_private_192_range(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private/reserved IP"):
validate_url("http://192.168.1.1/router")
def test_blocks_zero_address(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private/reserved IP"):
validate_url("http://0.0.0.0/")
def test_blocks_ipv6_localhost(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private/reserved IP"):
validate_url("http://[::1]/admin")
def test_blocks_ftp_scheme(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="not allowed"):
validate_url("ftp://example.com/file")
def test_blocks_empty_hostname(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="no hostname"):
validate_url("http:///path")
def test_blocks_unresolvable_host(self):
with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="Could not resolve"):
validate_url("http://this-host-definitely-does-not-exist-abc123.com/")
def test_escape_hatch(self, monkeypatch):
"""CREWAI_TOOLS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_PATHS=true bypasses URL validation."""
monkeypatch.setenv("CREWAI_TOOLS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_PATHS", "true")
# file:// would normally be blocked
result = validate_url("file:///etc/passwd")
assert result == "file:///etc/passwd"