diff --git a/docs/edge/ar/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx b/docs/edge/ar/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx
index 23211dabc..bb5c35682 100644
--- a/docs/edge/ar/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx
+++ b/docs/edge/ar/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ mode: "wide"
 
 يمنحكم CrewAI لبنات بناء: hooks وguardrails وHITL ومخرجات منظمة وحالة Flow. وهو لا يفعّلها كإعداد آمن افتراضي. يجب عليكم تعيين الأدوات وقوائم السماح وفحوصات الموافقة في كود التطبيق.
 
+تغطي هذه الصفحة نموذج التهديد وسلوك مسار التنفيذ. لحدود التنفيذ (`max_rpm` و`max_iter` و`max_execution_time`) والتفصيل وإعدادات الـ Agent، راجع [Agents](/ar/concepts/agents) و[تخصيص الـ Agents](/ar/learn/customizing-agents).
+
 | لبنة البناء | ما تفعله عند إضافتها |
 | --- | --- |
 | `HookAborted` في tool hook | يوقف استدعاء تلك الأداة فقط. يستمر الـ Agent. ويتلقى رسالة بأن الأداة حُظرت. |
@@ -79,6 +81,8 @@ researcher = Agent(
 )
 ```
 
+نص `backstory` عنصر تحكم ضعيف. وهو لا يمنع النموذج من اتباع النص غير الموثوق. استخدم tool hooks وقوائم السماح أدناه لفرض السياسة.
+
 لمدخلات Crew وFlow، استخدم [execution boundary hooks](/ar/learn/execution-boundary-hooks) (`INPUT`). هذه الـ hooks لا تعمل على `agent.kickoff()` المستقل. لـ MCP، راجع [أمان MCP](/ar/mcp/security).
 
 ## 2. حقن المطالبات
@@ -289,13 +293,18 @@ class PipelineState(BaseModel):
 class SecureOutreachFlow(Flow[PipelineState]):
     @start()
     def research(self):
-        # Fetch tools only; write structured notes into state
-        ...
+        result = researcher.kickoff(
+            f"Extract factual notes about {self.state.topic}."
+        )
+        self.state.notes = [result.raw]
 
     @listen(research)
     def send(self):
-        # No fetch tools; send or write tools sit behind hooks or HITL
-        ...
+        approved = "\n".join(self.state.notes)
+        result = sender.kickoff(
+            f"Send outreach using only these notes:\n{approved}"
+        )
+        self.state.email_status = result.raw
 ```
 
 راجع [بنية الإنتاج](/ar/concepts/production-architecture).
@@ -321,4 +330,7 @@ class SecureOutreachFlow(Flow[PipelineState]):
   <Card title="Human-in-the-Loop" icon="user-check" href="/ar/learn/human-in-the-loop">
     مراجعة بشرية للإجراءات عالية التأثير.
   </Card>
+  <Card title="تخصيص الـ Agents" icon="user-pen" href="/ar/learn/customizing-agents">
+    حدود التنفيذ والتفصيل وإعدادات الـ Agent.
+  </Card>
 </CardGroup>
diff --git a/docs/edge/en/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx b/docs/edge/en/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx
index 2c76548d9..b3a5bb191 100644
--- a/docs/edge/en/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx
+++ b/docs/edge/en/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ This page shows how to limit that risk. Related reference: [OWASP Top 10 for LLM
 
 CrewAI gives you building blocks: hooks, guardrails, human-in-the-loop (HITL), structured outputs, and Flow state. It does not turn these on as a secure default. You must set tools, allowlists, and approval checks in your application code.
 
+This page covers threat model and execution-path behavior. For execution limits (`max_rpm`, `max_iter`, `max_execution_time`), verbosity, and agent settings, see [Agents](/en/concepts/agents) and [Customize Agents](/en/learn/customizing-agents).
+
 | Building block | What it does when you add it |
 | --- | --- |
 | `HookAborted` in a tool hook | Stops that one tool call. The agent continues. It receives a message that the tool was blocked. |
@@ -79,6 +81,8 @@ researcher = Agent(
 )
 ```
 
+The `backstory` text is a soft control. It does not stop the model from following untrusted text. Use tool hooks and allowlists below to enforce policy.
+
 For Crew and Flow inputs, use [execution boundary hooks](/en/learn/execution-boundary-hooks) (`INPUT`). Those hooks do not run on standalone `agent.kickoff()`. For MCP, see [MCP Security](/en/mcp/security).
 
 ## 2. Prompt injection
@@ -289,13 +293,18 @@ class PipelineState(BaseModel):
 class SecureOutreachFlow(Flow[PipelineState]):
     @start()
     def research(self):
-        # Fetch tools only; write structured notes into state
-        ...
+        result = researcher.kickoff(
+            f"Extract factual notes about {self.state.topic}."
+        )
+        self.state.notes = [result.raw]
 
     @listen(research)
     def send(self):
-        # No fetch tools; send or write tools sit behind hooks or HITL
-        ...
+        approved = "\n".join(self.state.notes)
+        result = sender.kickoff(
+            f"Send outreach using only these notes:\n{approved}"
+        )
+        self.state.email_status = result.raw
 ```
 
 See [Production Architecture](/en/concepts/production-architecture).
@@ -321,4 +330,7 @@ See [Production Architecture](/en/concepts/production-architecture).
   <Card title="Human-in-the-Loop" icon="user-check" href="/en/learn/human-in-the-loop">
     Human review for high-impact actions.
   </Card>
+  <Card title="Customize Agents" icon="user-pen" href="/en/learn/customizing-agents">
+    Execution limits, verbosity, and agent settings.
+  </Card>
 </CardGroup>
diff --git a/docs/edge/ko/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx b/docs/edge/ko/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx
index b3f284b30..e69592136 100644
--- a/docs/edge/ko/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx
+++ b/docs/edge/ko/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ CrewAI 에이전트는 실제 동작을 수행하는 도구를 호출할 수 있
 
 CrewAI는 hooks, guardrails, HITL, 구조화된 출력, Flow state라는 구성 요소를 제공합니다. 이것들을 안전한 기본값으로 켜지는 않습니다. 도구, allowlist, 승인 검사는 애플리케이션 코드에서 설정해야 합니다.
 
+이 페이지는 위협 모델과 실행 경로 동작을 다룹니다. 실행 제한(`max_rpm`, `max_iter`, `max_execution_time`), verbose, 에이전트 설정은 [에이전트](/ko/concepts/agents)와 [에이전트 맞춤화](/ko/learn/customizing-agents)를 참고하세요.
+
 | 구성 요소 | 추가했을 때 하는 일 |
 | --- | --- |
 | tool hook의 `HookAborted` | 해당 도구 호출 하나만 중지합니다. 에이전트는 계속합니다. 도구가 차단되었다는 메시지를 받습니다. |
@@ -79,6 +81,8 @@ researcher = Agent(
 )
 ```
 
+`backstory` 텍스트는 약한 통제입니다. 모델이 신뢰할 수 없는 텍스트를 따르는 것을 막지 않습니다. 정책은 아래 tool hooks와 allowlist로 강제하세요.
+
 Crew와 Flow 입력에는 [execution boundary hooks](/ko/learn/execution-boundary-hooks) (`INPUT`)를 사용하세요. 이 hooks는 단독 `agent.kickoff()`에서는 실행되지 않습니다. MCP는 [MCP 보안](/ko/mcp/security)을 참고하세요.
 
 ## 2. 프롬프트 인젝션
@@ -289,13 +293,18 @@ class PipelineState(BaseModel):
 class SecureOutreachFlow(Flow[PipelineState]):
     @start()
     def research(self):
-        # Fetch tools only; write structured notes into state
-        ...
+        result = researcher.kickoff(
+            f"Extract factual notes about {self.state.topic}."
+        )
+        self.state.notes = [result.raw]
 
     @listen(research)
     def send(self):
-        # No fetch tools; send or write tools sit behind hooks or HITL
-        ...
+        approved = "\n".join(self.state.notes)
+        result = sender.kickoff(
+            f"Send outreach using only these notes:\n{approved}"
+        )
+        self.state.email_status = result.raw
 ```
 
 [프로덕션 아키텍처](/ko/concepts/production-architecture)를 참고하세요.
@@ -321,4 +330,7 @@ class SecureOutreachFlow(Flow[PipelineState]):
   <Card title="Human-in-the-Loop" icon="user-check" href="/ko/learn/human-in-the-loop">
     고영향 동작에 대한 사람 검토.
   </Card>
+  <Card title="에이전트 맞춤화" icon="user-pen" href="/ko/learn/customizing-agents">
+    실행 제한, verbose, 에이전트 설정.
+  </Card>
 </CardGroup>
diff --git a/docs/edge/pt-BR/concepts/agents.mdx b/docs/edge/pt-BR/concepts/agents.mdx
index 7c9f1ce5f..fb2bad3f2 100644
--- a/docs/edge/pt-BR/concepts/agents.mdx
+++ b/docs/edge/pt-BR/concepts/agents.mdx
@@ -582,6 +582,35 @@ agent = Agent(
   `respect_context_window` conforme deseja e o CrewAI cuida do resto!
 </Note>
 
+## Interação direta com o agente via `kickoff()` {#direct-agent-interaction-with-kickoff}
+
+Agentes podem ser usados diretamente, sem passar por uma Task ou um fluxo de Crew, com o método `kickoff()`. Isso oferece uma forma mais simples de interagir com um agente quando você não precisa da orquestração completa do crew.
+
+```python Code
+from crewai import Agent
+from crewai_tools import SerperDevTool
+
+# Criar um agente
+researcher = Agent(
+    role="AI Technology Researcher",
+    goal="Research the latest AI developments",
+    tools=[SerperDevTool()],
+    verbose=True
+)
+
+# Usar kickoff() para interagir diretamente com o agente
+result = researcher.kickoff("What are the latest developments in language models?")
+
+# Acessar a resposta bruta
+print(result.raw)
+```
+
+<Note>
+  `kickoff()` executa um `AgentExecutor`. Ele não cria uma Task nem um Crew.
+  O agente mantém role, goal, backstory e tools. O método retorna
+  `LiteAgentOutput`.
+</Note>
+
 ## Considerações e Boas Práticas Importantes
 
 ### Segurança e Execução de Código
diff --git a/docs/edge/pt-BR/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx b/docs/edge/pt-BR/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx
index 38787a40c..8d285e797 100644
--- a/docs/edge/pt-BR/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx
+++ b/docs/edge/pt-BR/guides/agents/secure-agent-design.mdx
@@ -13,6 +13,8 @@ Esta página mostra como limitar esse risco. Referência relacionada: [OWASP Top
 
 O CrewAI oferece blocos de construção: hooks, guardrails, HITL, saídas estruturadas e estado de Flow. Ele não liga esses recursos como um padrão seguro. Você deve definir ferramentas, allowlists e checagens de aprovação no código da aplicação.
 
+Esta página cobre o modelo de ameaça e o comportamento por caminho de execução. Para limites de execução (`max_rpm`, `max_iter`, `max_execution_time`), verbosidade e configurações do agente, veja [Agentes](/pt-BR/concepts/agents) e [Personalize Agentes](/pt-BR/learn/customizing-agents).
+
 | Bloco de construção | O que faz quando você o adiciona |
 | --- | --- |
 | `HookAborted` em um tool hook | Interrompe aquela chamada de ferramenta. O agente continua. Ele recebe uma mensagem de que a ferramenta foi bloqueada. |
@@ -79,6 +81,8 @@ researcher = Agent(
 )
 ```
 
+O texto de `backstory` é um controle fraco. Ele não impede o modelo de seguir texto não confiável. Use tool hooks e allowlists abaixo para aplicar a política.
+
 Para entradas de Crew e Flow, use [execution boundary hooks](/pt-BR/learn/execution-boundary-hooks) (`INPUT`). Esses hooks não rodam em `agent.kickoff()` isolado. Para MCP, veja [Segurança MCP](/pt-BR/mcp/security).
 
 ## 2. Prompt injection
@@ -289,13 +293,18 @@ class PipelineState(BaseModel):
 class SecureOutreachFlow(Flow[PipelineState]):
     @start()
     def research(self):
-        # Fetch tools only; write structured notes into state
-        ...
+        result = researcher.kickoff(
+            f"Extract factual notes about {self.state.topic}."
+        )
+        self.state.notes = [result.raw]
 
     @listen(research)
     def send(self):
-        # No fetch tools; send or write tools sit behind hooks or HITL
-        ...
+        approved = "\n".join(self.state.notes)
+        result = sender.kickoff(
+            f"Send outreach using only these notes:\n{approved}"
+        )
+        self.state.email_status = result.raw
 ```
 
 Veja [Arquitetura de Produção](/pt-BR/concepts/production-architecture).
@@ -321,4 +330,7 @@ Veja [Arquitetura de Produção](/pt-BR/concepts/production-architecture).
   <Card title="Human-in-the-Loop" icon="user-check" href="/pt-BR/learn/human-in-the-loop">
     Revisão humana para ações de alto impacto.
   </Card>
+  <Card title="Personalize Agentes" icon="user-pen" href="/pt-BR/learn/customizing-agents">
+    Limites de execução, verbosidade e configurações do agente.
+  </Card>
 </CardGroup>