Code interpreter sandbox escape (#4791)
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* [SECURITY] Fix sandbox escape vulnerability in CodeInterpreterTool (F-001)

This commit addresses a critical security vulnerability where the CodeInterpreterTool
could be exploited via sandbox escape attacks when Docker was unavailable.

Changes:
- Remove insecure fallback to restricted sandbox in run_code_safety()
- Now fails closed with RuntimeError when Docker is unavailable
- Mark run_code_in_restricted_sandbox() as deprecated and insecure
- Add clear security warnings to SandboxPython class documentation
- Update tests to reflect secure-by-default behavior
- Add test demonstrating the sandbox escape vulnerability
- Update README with security requirements and best practices

The previous implementation would fall back to a Python-based 'restricted sandbox'
when Docker was unavailable. However, this sandbox could be easily bypassed using
Python object introspection to recover the original __import__ function, allowing
arbitrary module access and command execution on the host.

The fix enforces Docker as a requirement for safe code execution. Users who cannot
use Docker must explicitly enable unsafe_mode=True, acknowledging the security risks.

Security Impact:
- Prevents RCE via sandbox escape when Docker is unavailable
- Enforces fail-closed security model
- Maintains backward compatibility via unsafe_mode flag

References:
- https://docs.crewai.com/tools/ai-ml/codeinterpretertool

Co-authored-by: Rip&Tear <theCyberTech@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add security fix documentation for F-001

Co-authored-by: Rip&Tear <theCyberTech@users.noreply.github.com>

* Add Slack summary for security fix

Co-authored-by: Rip&Tear <theCyberTech@users.noreply.github.com>

* Delete SECURITY_FIX_F001.md

* Delete SLACK_SUMMARY.md

* chore: regen cassettes

* chore: regen more cassettes

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

* Potential fix for pull request finding

Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>

---------

Co-authored-by: Cursor Agent <cursoragent@cursor.com>
Co-authored-by: Rip&Tear <theCyberTech@users.noreply.github.com>
Co-authored-by: Greyson LaLonde <greyson@crewai.com>
Co-authored-by: Copilot Autofix powered by AI <175728472+Copilot@users.noreply.github.com>
This commit is contained in:
Rip&Tear
2026-03-15 13:18:02 +08:00
committed by GitHub
parent e1d7de0dba
commit fb2323b3de
9 changed files with 2811 additions and 3056 deletions

View File

@@ -1,13 +1,27 @@
# CodeInterpreterTool
## Description
This tool is used to give the Agent the ability to run code (Python3) from the code generated by the Agent itself. The code is executed in a sandboxed environment, so it is safe to run any code.
This tool is used to give the Agent the ability to run code (Python3) from the code generated by the Agent itself. The code is executed in a Docker container for secure isolation.
It is incredible useful since it allows the Agent to generate code, run it in the same environment, get the result and use it to make decisions.
It is incredibly useful since it allows the Agent to generate code, run it in an isolated environment, get the result and use it to make decisions.
## ⚠️ Security Requirements
**Docker is REQUIRED** for safe code execution. The tool will refuse to execute code without Docker to prevent security vulnerabilities.
### Why Docker is Required
Previous versions included a "restricted sandbox" fallback when Docker was unavailable. This has been **removed** due to critical security vulnerabilities:
- The Python-based sandbox could be escaped via object introspection
- Attackers could recover the original `__import__` function and access any module
- This allowed arbitrary command execution on the host system
**Docker provides real process isolation** and is the only secure way to execute untrusted code.
## Requirements
- Docker
- **Docker (REQUIRED)** - Install from [docker.com](https://docs.docker.com/get-docker/)
## Installation
Install the crewai_tools package
@@ -17,7 +31,9 @@ pip install 'crewai[tools]'
## Example
Remember that when using this tool, the code must be generated by the Agent itself. The code must be a Python3 code. And it will take some time for the first time to run because it needs to build the Docker image.
Remember that when using this tool, the code must be generated by the Agent itself. The code must be Python3 code. It will take some time the first time to run because it needs to build the Docker image.
### Basic Usage (Docker Container - Recommended)
```python
from crewai_tools import CodeInterpreterTool
@@ -28,7 +44,9 @@ Agent(
)
```
Or if you need to pass your own Dockerfile just do this
### Custom Dockerfile
If you need to pass your own Dockerfile:
```python
from crewai_tools import CodeInterpreterTool
@@ -39,15 +57,39 @@ Agent(
)
```
If it is difficult to connect to docker daemon automatically (especially for macOS users), you can do this to setup docker host manually
### Manual Docker Host Configuration
If it is difficult to connect to the Docker daemon automatically (especially for macOS users), you can set up the Docker host manually:
```python
from crewai_tools import CodeInterpreterTool
Agent(
...
tools=[CodeInterpreterTool(user_docker_base_url="<Docker Host Base Url>",
user_dockerfile_path="<Dockerfile_path>")],
tools=[CodeInterpreterTool(
user_docker_base_url="<Docker Host Base Url>",
user_dockerfile_path="<Dockerfile_path>"
)],
)
```
### Unsafe Mode (NOT RECOMMENDED)
If you absolutely cannot use Docker and **fully trust the code source**, you can use unsafe mode:
```python
from crewai_tools import CodeInterpreterTool
# WARNING: Only use with fully trusted code!
Agent(
...
tools=[CodeInterpreterTool(unsafe_mode=True)],
)
```
**⚠️ SECURITY WARNING:** `unsafe_mode=True` executes code directly on the host without any isolation. Only use this if:
- You completely trust the code being executed
- You understand the security risks
- You cannot install Docker in your environment
For production use, **always use Docker** (the default mode).

View File

@@ -50,11 +50,16 @@ class CodeInterpreterSchema(BaseModel):
class SandboxPython:
"""A restricted Python execution environment for running code safely.
"""INSECURE: A restricted Python execution environment with known vulnerabilities.
This class provides methods to safely execute Python code by restricting access to
potentially dangerous modules and built-in functions. It creates a sandboxed
environment where harmful operations are blocked.
WARNING: This class does NOT provide real security isolation and is vulnerable to
sandbox escape attacks via Python object introspection. Attackers can recover the
original __import__ function and bypass all restrictions.
DO NOT USE for untrusted code execution. Use Docker containers instead.
This class attempts to restrict access to dangerous modules and built-in functions
but provides no real security boundary against a motivated attacker.
"""
BLOCKED_MODULES: ClassVar[set[str]] = {
@@ -299,8 +304,8 @@ class CodeInterpreterTool(BaseTool):
def run_code_safety(self, code: str, libraries_used: list[str]) -> str:
"""Runs code in the safest available environment.
Attempts to run code in Docker if available, falls back to a restricted
sandbox if Docker is not available.
Requires Docker to be available for secure code execution. Fails closed
if Docker is not available to prevent sandbox escape vulnerabilities.
Args:
code: The Python code to execute as a string.
@@ -308,10 +313,24 @@ class CodeInterpreterTool(BaseTool):
Returns:
The output of the executed code as a string.
Raises:
RuntimeError: If Docker is not available, as the restricted sandbox
is vulnerable to escape attacks and should not be used
for untrusted code execution.
"""
if self._check_docker_available():
return self.run_code_in_docker(code, libraries_used)
return self.run_code_in_restricted_sandbox(code)
error_msg = (
"Docker is required for safe code execution but is not available. "
"The restricted sandbox fallback has been removed due to security vulnerabilities "
"that allow sandbox escape via Python object introspection. "
"Please install Docker (https://docs.docker.com/get-docker/) or use unsafe_mode=True "
"if you trust the code source and understand the security risks."
)
Printer.print(error_msg, color="bold_red")
raise RuntimeError(error_msg)
def run_code_in_docker(self, code: str, libraries_used: list[str]) -> str:
"""Runs Python code in a Docker container for safe isolation.
@@ -342,10 +361,19 @@ class CodeInterpreterTool(BaseTool):
@staticmethod
def run_code_in_restricted_sandbox(code: str) -> str:
"""Runs Python code in a restricted sandbox environment.
"""DEPRECATED AND INSECURE: Runs Python code in a restricted sandbox environment.
Executes the code with restricted access to potentially dangerous modules and
built-in functions for basic safety when Docker is not available.
WARNING: This method is vulnerable to sandbox escape attacks via Python object
introspection and should NOT be used for untrusted code execution. It has been
deprecated and is only kept for backward compatibility with trusted code.
The "restricted" environment can be bypassed by attackers who can:
- Use object graph introspection to recover the original __import__ function
- Access any Python module including os, subprocess, sys, etc.
- Execute arbitrary commands on the host system
Use run_code_in_docker() for secure code execution, or run_code_unsafe()
if you explicitly acknowledge the security risks.
Args:
code: The Python code to execute as a string.
@@ -354,7 +382,10 @@ class CodeInterpreterTool(BaseTool):
The value of the 'result' variable from the executed code,
or an error message if execution failed.
"""
Printer.print("Running code in restricted sandbox", color="yellow")
Printer.print(
"WARNING: Running code in INSECURE restricted sandbox (vulnerable to escape attacks)",
color="bold_red"
)
exec_locals: dict[str, Any] = {}
try:
SandboxPython.exec(code=code, locals_=exec_locals)