fix(tools): re-validate redirects and pin peer IP to close SSRF bypass

validate_url checked the URL string but ScrapeWebsiteTool and
ScrapeElementFromWebsiteTool then fetched with requests' default
allow_redirects=True, so a public host that 302-redirected to an
internal address reached it without re-validation. The resolved IPs
were also discarded, leaving a DNS time-of-check/time-of-use gap.

Add crewai_tools.security.safe_requests:
- SSRFProtectedAdapter re-runs validate_url on every send, including
  each redirect hop (Session.send calls the adapter per hop).
- Connections validate the actual connected peer IP at connect time,
  so the IP that was authorised is the IP that is used (closes the
  DNS-rebinding gap).

Route the two direct-fetch scrape tools through safe_get and add tests.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Opus 4.8 <noreply@anthropic.com>

lib/crewai-tools/src/crewai_tools/security/safe_requests.py

@@ -0,0 +1,158 @@
+"""SSRF-safe HTTP fetching for crewai-tools.
+
+:func:`validate_url` checks the URL it is handed, but it cannot protect a
+fetch on its own: ``requests`` re-resolves DNS at connect time and follows
+redirects automatically, so a public-looking host that 302-redirects to an
+internal address (or that rebinds DNS between validation and connect) reaches
+the internal target without ever being re-checked.
+
+This module closes both gaps at the connection layer:
+
+* :class:`SSRFProtectedAdapter` re-runs :func:`validate_url` for every request
+  it sends. ``requests.Session.send`` invokes the adapter once per redirect
+  hop, so each ``Location`` target is validated before it is followed.
+* The adapter's connections validate the *actual* peer IP immediately after
+  the socket connects. The IP that was authorised is therefore the IP the
+  connection uses, removing the DNS time-of-check/time-of-use gap that
+  :func:`validate_url`'s own ``getaddrinfo`` call leaves open.
+
+Use :func:`safe_get` (or :func:`create_safe_session`) instead of calling
+``requests.get`` directly from any tool that fetches a user- or
+LLM-controlled URL.
+"""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+from typing import Any
+
+import requests
+from requests.adapters import DEFAULT_POOLBLOCK, HTTPAdapter
+from urllib3.connection import HTTPConnection, HTTPSConnection
+from urllib3.connectionpool import HTTPConnectionPool, HTTPSConnectionPool
+from urllib3.poolmanager import PoolManager
+
+from crewai_tools.security.safe_path import (
+    _is_escape_hatch_enabled,
+    _is_private_or_reserved,
+    validate_url,
+)
+
+
+def _assert_safe_peer(sock: Any) -> None:
+    """Raise if a connected socket's peer is a private/reserved address.
+
+    Validating the real peer (rather than a separately resolved IP) is what
+    defeats DNS rebinding: the address we connected to is the address we check.
+    """
+    if _is_escape_hatch_enabled():
+        return
+    try:
+        peer = sock.getpeername()
+    except OSError:
+        return
+    ip_str = str(peer[0])
+    if _is_private_or_reserved(ip_str):
+        raise ValueError(
+            f"Connection resolved to private/reserved IP {ip_str}. "
+            f"Access to internal networks is not allowed (possible SSRF via "
+            f"redirect or DNS rebinding)."
+        )
+
+
+class _SafeHTTPConnection(HTTPConnection):
+    def connect(self) -> None:
+        super().connect()
+        _assert_safe_peer(self.sock)
+
+
+class _SafeHTTPSConnection(HTTPSConnection):
+    def connect(self) -> None:
+        super().connect()
+        _assert_safe_peer(self.sock)
+
+
+class _SafeHTTPConnectionPool(HTTPConnectionPool):
+    ConnectionCls = _SafeHTTPConnection
+
+
+class _SafeHTTPSConnectionPool(HTTPSConnectionPool):
+    ConnectionCls = _SafeHTTPSConnection
+
+
+_SAFE_POOL_CLASSES = {
+    "http": _SafeHTTPConnectionPool,
+    "https": _SafeHTTPSConnectionPool,
+}
+
+
+class _SafePoolManager(PoolManager):
+    def __init__(self, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> None:
+        super().__init__(*args, **kwargs)
+        self.pool_classes_by_scheme = _SAFE_POOL_CLASSES
+
+
+class SSRFProtectedAdapter(HTTPAdapter):
+    """Transport adapter that re-validates every hop and pins the peer IP.
+
+    ``validate_url`` runs on each ``send`` — including every redirect hop
+    ``requests`` follows — and the underlying connections reject any socket
+    that ends up connected to a private/reserved address.
+    """
+
+    def init_poolmanager(
+        self,
+        connections: int,
+        maxsize: int,
+        block: bool = DEFAULT_POOLBLOCK,
+        **pool_kwargs: Any,
+    ) -> None:
+        self.poolmanager = _SafePoolManager(
+            num_pools=connections,
+            maxsize=maxsize,
+            block=block,
+            **pool_kwargs,
+        )
+
+    def send(self, request: Any, *args: Any, **kwargs: Any) -> Any:
+        # Re-validate the target of every request the session sends. Because
+        # Session.send calls this once per redirect hop, each Location is
+        # checked before it is followed.
+        validate_url(request.url)
+        return super().send(request, *args, **kwargs)
+
+
+def create_safe_session() -> requests.Session:
+    """Return a ``requests.Session`` that is hardened against SSRF.
+
+    The session validates every request (and redirect hop) and pins
+    connections to the validated peer IP.
+    """
+    session = requests.Session()
+    adapter = SSRFProtectedAdapter()
+    session.mount("http://", adapter)
+    session.mount("https://", adapter)
+    return session
+
+
+def safe_get(url: str, **kwargs: Any) -> requests.Response:
+    """Perform an SSRF-safe ``GET``.
+
+    Drop-in replacement for ``requests.get`` for tools that fetch a
+    user- or LLM-controlled URL. Validates the initial URL and every redirect
+    hop, and rejects connections that land on private/reserved addresses.
+
+    Args:
+        url: The URL to fetch.
+        **kwargs: Forwarded to ``Session.get`` (``headers``, ``cookies``,
+            ``timeout``, ...).
+
+    Returns:
+        The ``requests.Response``.
+
+    Raises:
+        ValueError: If the URL, a redirect target, or the connected peer is
+            not allowed.
+    """
+    validate_url(url)
+    with create_safe_session() as session:
+        return session.get(url, **kwargs)

lib/crewai-tools/src/crewai_tools/tools/scrape_element_from_website/scrape_element_from_website.py

@@ -3,9 +3,8 @@ from typing import Any
 
 from crewai.tools import BaseTool
 from pydantic import BaseModel, Field
-import requests
 
-from crewai_tools.security.safe_path import validate_url
+from crewai_tools.security.safe_requests import safe_get
 
 
 try:
@@ -83,8 +82,7 @@ class ScrapeElementFromWebsiteTool(BaseTool):
         if website_url is None or css_element is None:
             raise ValueError("Both website_url and css_element must be provided.")
 
-        website_url = validate_url(website_url)
+        page = safe_get(
-        page = requests.get(
             website_url,
             headers=self.headers,
             cookies=self.cookies if self.cookies else {},

lib/crewai-tools/src/crewai_tools/tools/scrape_website_tool/scrape_website_tool.py

@@ -3,9 +3,8 @@ import re
 from typing import Any
 
 from pydantic import Field
-import requests
 
-from crewai_tools.security.safe_path import validate_url
+from crewai_tools.security.safe_requests import safe_get
 
 
 try:
@@ -75,8 +74,7 @@ class ScrapeWebsiteTool(BaseTool):
         if website_url is None:
             raise ValueError("Website URL must be provided.")
 
-        website_url = validate_url(website_url)
+        page = safe_get(
-        page = requests.get(
             website_url,
             timeout=15,
             headers=self.headers,

lib/crewai-tools/tests/utilities/test_safe_requests.py

@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
+"""Tests for SSRF-safe HTTP fetching (redirect + DNS-rebinding protection)."""
+
+from __future__ import annotations
+
+import http.server
+import socketserver
+import threading
+
+import pytest
+import requests
+
+from crewai_tools.security import safe_requests
+from crewai_tools.security.safe_requests import (
+    SSRFProtectedAdapter,
+    create_safe_session,
+    safe_get,
+)
+
+
+INTERNAL_BODY = b"INTERNAL-ONLY-SECRET"
+
+
+class _InternalHandler(http.server.BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
+    def do_GET(self):
+        self.send_response(200)
+        self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain")
+        self.end_headers()
+        self.wfile.write(INTERNAL_BODY)
+
+    def log_message(self, *args):  # silence
+        pass
+
+
+def _serve(handler):
+    """Start a localhost server on an ephemeral port; return (server, port)."""
+    server = socketserver.TCPServer(("127.0.0.1", 0), handler)
+    port = server.server_address[1]
+    threading.Thread(target=server.serve_forever, daemon=True).start()
+    return server, port
+
+
+class TestRedirectRevalidation:
+    """Layer 1: validate_url runs on every send, including each redirect hop.
+
+    ``requests.Session.send`` calls ``adapter.send`` once per redirect hop, so
+    re-validating in ``send`` is what blocks a 302 to an internal target.
+    """
+
+    def test_adapter_revalidates_before_any_network_call(self, monkeypatch):
+        calls: list[str] = []
+
+        def spy(url: str) -> str:
+            calls.append(url)
+            if "internal.target" in url:
+                raise ValueError("URL resolves to private/reserved IP")
+            return url
+
+        monkeypatch.setattr(safe_requests, "validate_url", spy)
+
+        adapter = SSRFProtectedAdapter()
+        # Internal redirect target: send() must reject it before ever calling
+        # the real transport (super().send is never reached).
+        req = requests.Request("GET", "http://internal.target/").prepare()
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private/reserved"):
+            adapter.send(req)
+        assert calls == ["http://internal.target/"]
+
+    def test_session_mounts_protected_adapter(self):
+        session = create_safe_session()
+        assert isinstance(session.get_adapter("http://x"), SSRFProtectedAdapter)
+        assert isinstance(session.get_adapter("https://x"), SSRFProtectedAdapter)
+
+
+class _FakeSock:
+    def __init__(self, peer):
+        self._peer = peer
+
+    def getpeername(self):
+        return self._peer
+
+
+class TestConnectionPeerGuard:
+    """Layer 2: the connection rejects an internal peer IP at connect time.
+
+    This is what closes the validate-then-connect DNS-rebinding gap — the IP
+    the socket actually connected to is the IP that gets checked, so a host
+    that resolved public at validation time but connects internal is blocked.
+    """
+
+    def test_safe_get_blocks_direct_internal(self):
+        # No network: validate_url rejects 127.0.0.1 at the URL layer first.
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private/reserved"):
+            safe_get("http://127.0.0.1:9/", timeout=10)
+
+    def test_assert_safe_peer_blocks_private(self):
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private/reserved"):
+            safe_requests._assert_safe_peer(_FakeSock(("127.0.0.1", 80)))
+
+    def test_assert_safe_peer_blocks_metadata(self):
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private/reserved"):
+            safe_requests._assert_safe_peer(_FakeSock(("169.254.169.254", 80)))
+
+    def test_assert_safe_peer_allows_public(self):
+        # A public IP must not raise.
+        safe_requests._assert_safe_peer(_FakeSock(("93.184.216.34", 80)))
+
+    def test_assert_safe_peer_respects_escape_hatch(self, monkeypatch):
+        monkeypatch.setenv("CREWAI_TOOLS_ALLOW_UNSAFE_PATHS", "true")
+        # No raise even for a private peer when the escape hatch is on.
+        safe_requests._assert_safe_peer(_FakeSock(("127.0.0.1", 80)))
+
+    def test_connection_validates_peer_after_connect(self, monkeypatch):
+        """_SafeHTTPConnection.connect runs the peer guard after connecting."""
+        conn = safe_requests._SafeHTTPConnection("example.com")
+
+        def fake_super_connect(self):
+            # Simulate a rebind: we connected to an internal address.
+            self.sock = _FakeSock(("127.0.0.1", 80))
+
+        monkeypatch.setattr(
+            safe_requests.HTTPConnection, "connect", fake_super_connect
+        )
+        with pytest.raises(ValueError, match="private/reserved"):
+            conn.connect()